PhD
My research explores non-standard formulations of physicalism that reject the metaphysical supervenience of the mental on the physical. I argue that such formulations of physicalism provide indispensable resources for investigating the nature of consciousness and other higher-level phenomena.
Publications
Forthcoming. "In Defence of Indeterministic Building", in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: In this paper, I set out a new argument for the coherence of indeterministic building and defend its premises. The argument hinges on the underexplored notion of indeterministic supervenience. First, I argue that the logical possibility of an indeterministic supervenience relation entails the coherence of indeterministic building. Second, I argue that indeterministic supervenience is indeed logically possible. I conclude that there is a straightforward argument for the coherence of indeterministic building that has so far gone unnoticed.
Forthcoming. "Grounding Physicalism and the Metaphysical Exclusion Problem", in Ratio.
Abstract: Ground physicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work together to create the strengthened exclusion problem, which is significantly more difficult to resist than the causal exclusion problem alone. I then set out a solution to the strengthened exclusion problem that draws on the underexplored notion of indeterministic grounding. I conclude that the ability of indeterministic grounding to solve the strengthened exclusion problem provides us with a new reason to accept indeterministic ground physicalism.
2024. "Type-R Physicalism", in Philosophical Psychology.
Abstract: In this paper, I argue for an often-neglected solution to the conceivability argument: the reconciliatory response. Its advocates state that, even if zombies are metaphysically possible, it does not follow that all versions of physicalism are false. To make the reconciliatory response, we must construct a theory that counts as a version of physicalism (because it makes higher-level facts count as physical) but also allows for the metaphysical possibility of zombies. Call any physicalist theory that can make the reconciliatory response type-R physicalism. In this paper, I discuss one version of type-R physicalism: stochastic ground physicalism (SGP). First, I argue that type-R physicalism, construed as SGP, offers physicalists an attractive rationalist package that no other version of physicalism can provide. Second, I address two concerns that have been underexplored in the literature. First, the charge that SGP is incoherent because it fails to provide metaphysical explanations. Second, the charge that type-R physicalism is not a genuine form of physicalism because the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical is a necessary condition for any formulation of physicalism. I argue that both concerns are ill-founded.
Presentations
* Indicates referred presentation.
July 2025, “The Grandfather Paradox and Physical Probabilities”, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Postgraduate session, University of Glasgow.*
March 2025, “Towards a Theory of Full Indeterministic Grounding”, TPSM Work-in Progress Group, University of Glasgow.
January 2025, “Time Travel Paradoxes and Degrees of Recombination”, Eighteenth Annual Cambridge Graduate Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, University of Cambridge.*
December 2024, “Time Travel Paradoxes and Degrees of Recombination”, TPSM Work-in Progress Group, University of Glasgow.
December 2024, “Zombie-Proof Physicalism and Mary’s Revenge”, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind Workshop, University of Fribourg.
November 2024, “In Defence of Indeterministic Building”, Experience & Reason Colloquium, University of Fribourg.
October 2024, “Inverted Qualia, Symmetry-Breaking, and Indeterminism”, Ethics and Political Philosophy Colloquium, University of Fribourg.
August 2024, “In Defence of Indeterministic Building”, Society for the Metaphysics of Science, online.*
June 2024, “In Defence of Indeterministic Building”, Issues on the (Im)possible (X).*
December 2023, “Berkeleyan Phenomenality”, PGR Work-in-Progress Day, University of Southampton.
December 2023, “Strengthening the Exclusion Argument”, 8th Stockholm Graduate Conference, Stockholm University.*
December 2023, “Nomopsychism: A New Solution to the Combination Problem”, Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation Work in Progress Group (With Toby Friend).
August 2023, “Indeterministic Grounding and Physicality”, Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Dalhousie University.*
July 2023, “Indeterministic Grounding and Physicality”, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Postgraduate session, University of London, Birkbeck.*
June 2023, “Indeterministic Grounding and Physicality”, Open Minds XVI, University of Manchester.*
May 2023, “Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness”, Threads of Emergence Workshop, UWE Bristol.*
May 2023, ““Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness” Naturalism in Philosophy Conference, Sofia University.*
April 2023, ““Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness”, Harvard-MiT Graduate Conference, Harvard University.*
December 2022, “Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness”, Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation Work in Progress Group.
My research explores non-standard formulations of physicalism that reject the metaphysical supervenience of the mental on the physical. I argue that such formulations of physicalism provide indispensable resources for investigating the nature of consciousness and other higher-level phenomena.
Publications
Forthcoming. "In Defence of Indeterministic Building", in Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Abstract: In this paper, I set out a new argument for the coherence of indeterministic building and defend its premises. The argument hinges on the underexplored notion of indeterministic supervenience. First, I argue that the logical possibility of an indeterministic supervenience relation entails the coherence of indeterministic building. Second, I argue that indeterministic supervenience is indeed logically possible. I conclude that there is a straightforward argument for the coherence of indeterministic building that has so far gone unnoticed.
Forthcoming. "Grounding Physicalism and the Metaphysical Exclusion Problem", in Ratio.
Abstract: Ground physicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work together to create the strengthened exclusion problem, which is significantly more difficult to resist than the causal exclusion problem alone. I then set out a solution to the strengthened exclusion problem that draws on the underexplored notion of indeterministic grounding. I conclude that the ability of indeterministic grounding to solve the strengthened exclusion problem provides us with a new reason to accept indeterministic ground physicalism.
2024. "Type-R Physicalism", in Philosophical Psychology.
Abstract: In this paper, I argue for an often-neglected solution to the conceivability argument: the reconciliatory response. Its advocates state that, even if zombies are metaphysically possible, it does not follow that all versions of physicalism are false. To make the reconciliatory response, we must construct a theory that counts as a version of physicalism (because it makes higher-level facts count as physical) but also allows for the metaphysical possibility of zombies. Call any physicalist theory that can make the reconciliatory response type-R physicalism. In this paper, I discuss one version of type-R physicalism: stochastic ground physicalism (SGP). First, I argue that type-R physicalism, construed as SGP, offers physicalists an attractive rationalist package that no other version of physicalism can provide. Second, I address two concerns that have been underexplored in the literature. First, the charge that SGP is incoherent because it fails to provide metaphysical explanations. Second, the charge that type-R physicalism is not a genuine form of physicalism because the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical is a necessary condition for any formulation of physicalism. I argue that both concerns are ill-founded.
Presentations
* Indicates referred presentation.
July 2025, “The Grandfather Paradox and Physical Probabilities”, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Postgraduate session, University of Glasgow.*
March 2025, “Towards a Theory of Full Indeterministic Grounding”, TPSM Work-in Progress Group, University of Glasgow.
January 2025, “Time Travel Paradoxes and Degrees of Recombination”, Eighteenth Annual Cambridge Graduate Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, University of Cambridge.*
December 2024, “Time Travel Paradoxes and Degrees of Recombination”, TPSM Work-in Progress Group, University of Glasgow.
December 2024, “Zombie-Proof Physicalism and Mary’s Revenge”, Metaphysics and Philosophy of Mind Workshop, University of Fribourg.
November 2024, “In Defence of Indeterministic Building”, Experience & Reason Colloquium, University of Fribourg.
October 2024, “Inverted Qualia, Symmetry-Breaking, and Indeterminism”, Ethics and Political Philosophy Colloquium, University of Fribourg.
August 2024, “In Defence of Indeterministic Building”, Society for the Metaphysics of Science, online.*
June 2024, “In Defence of Indeterministic Building”, Issues on the (Im)possible (X).*
December 2023, “Berkeleyan Phenomenality”, PGR Work-in-Progress Day, University of Southampton.
December 2023, “Strengthening the Exclusion Argument”, 8th Stockholm Graduate Conference, Stockholm University.*
December 2023, “Nomopsychism: A New Solution to the Combination Problem”, Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation Work in Progress Group (With Toby Friend).
August 2023, “Indeterministic Grounding and Physicality”, Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Dalhousie University.*
July 2023, “Indeterministic Grounding and Physicality”, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Postgraduate session, University of London, Birkbeck.*
June 2023, “Indeterministic Grounding and Physicality”, Open Minds XVI, University of Manchester.*
May 2023, “Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness”, Threads of Emergence Workshop, UWE Bristol.*
May 2023, ““Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness” Naturalism in Philosophy Conference, Sofia University.*
April 2023, ““Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness”, Harvard-MiT Graduate Conference, Harvard University.*
December 2022, “Containment, Indeterminism, and Nothing-Over-and-Aboveness”, Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation Work in Progress Group.
